of some type of managed care organization (MCO) (Foster-Higgins, 1996) .
Medicare and Medicaid are also experiencing growth in managed care enrollment. During calendar year 1995, Medicare enrollment in risk-bearing HMOs grew by more than 26 percent More than 4 million beneficiaries-over 10 percent of all Medicare enrollees-are now enrolled in managed care plans. As of March 1, 1996, Medicare was contracting with 289 MCOs-202 of them on a risk basis (Health Care Financing Administration, 1996a) .
From June 1994 to June 1995, Medicaid managed care enrollment grew by more than 50 percent, reaching 11.6 million individuals-more than 32 percent of all program beneficiaries. Forty-nine States employ managed care in their Medicaid programs, 46 through waivers approved by HCFA (Health Care Financing Administration, 1995a) .
The incentives in managed care are very different than those of traditional fee-forservice (FFS). In traditional FFS, the provider can make more by providing more services. In capitated managed care arrangements, a provider of care receives a fixed payment regardless of the amount of care delivered. In theory, by providing care in a more coordinated and cost efficient manner, prepaid capitation can lead to curbs on unnecessary services and more appropriate utilization. However, it can also lead to undertreatment, particularly since capitated payments are not currently adjusted to reflect the health status of the enrolled population. Thus, the challenge for the future of managed care is to test payment systems that minimize these potentially negative inducements and, where possible, build in incentives for MCOs to ensure the provision of high-quality services, particularly to those patients that need them the most HCFA represents the Nation's largest managed care purchaser on behalf of Medicare beneficiaries and as a partner with the States in the joint venture of Medicaid. As we mentioned, Medicaid is becoming a managed care program at a much faster pace than Medicare as States attempt to reduce program costs while expanding coverage to new populations. The vast majority of States have indicated their intention to enroll their Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC). A growing number of States are also including related populations, and many chronically ill and disabled in MCOs within the next 4-5 years.
The challenge of modernizing payment methods in Medicaid is complicated by the fact that while AFDC and related populations represent about 70 percent of program beneficiaries, they account for only one-third of program vendor payments (Health Care Financing Administration, 1995b) . Of all Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries, "mothers and children" are the most similar to commercial managed care enrollees from an actuarial perspective, therefore representing a logical initial foray for the managed care industry into government program populations. It is the chronically ill and disabled populations, such as those with AIDS or behavioral health problems, whose nonlong-term care medical costs account for another one-third of Medicaid vendor payments while making up 15 percent of program beneficiaries (Health Care Financing Administration, 1996b) . If policymakers wish to move these populations into managed care, appropriate methods of paying for their managed health care services will be a central consideration of any approach.
The article by Kronick, Dreyfus, Lee, and Zhou examines methods of risk-adjusting reimbursements for disabled Medicaid beneficiaries, looking specifically at one of the most promising approaches: diagnostic cost groups. The authors analyze claims data from a number of States and then apply their "predictive diagnostic categories" to that data, looking at the distribution of disabled beneficiaries by condition and the estimated effects on subsequentyear costs of various types of disability and illness. The merits and challenges of implementing a diagnosis-based risk-adjustment system are explored.
Several articles in this issue of the Review examine the adjusted average per capita cost (AAPCC)-the payment methodology that HCFA currently uses to pay its risk plans serving Medicare beneficiaries. Put in place by the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act (TEFRA) of 1982, this methodology is designed to pay HMOs that risk-contract with the Medicare program 95 percent of the average annual cost of serving Medicare beneficiaries in the FFS sector. This methodology was designed to ensure that Medicare costs for HMO enrollees would be reduced by 5 percent-if the AAPCC accurately reflects what Medicare costs for enrolled beneficiaries would have been had they remained in FFS. However, while the AAPCC adjusts for the demographic status of enrollees in terms of age, sex, Medicaid eligibility, and institutional status, it does not adjust for health status differences within these categories. If HMO enrollees within a demographic category systematically differ from non-enrollees in terms of health status, selection bias results and payments to the HMO will be inaccurate. Medicare currently pays HMOs a capitated amount for each enrollee based on average FFS spending in the enrollee's demographic group. HCFA's selection studies showed that HMO enrollees tend to be healthier than average, indicating that capitation amounts may be too high (Mathematica Policy Research, Inc., 1993) .
Since the AAPCC is based on costs for Medicare beneficiaries in the FFS sector, any payment inaccuracies that are a result of selection bias may be exacerbated in areas that exhibit a high degree of managed care penetration. If HMOs are enrolling the healthiest beneficiaries in these areas, overpayment to the plans will be magnified as penetration increases and payments are increasingly based on a sicker-than-average population remaining in FFS. (ESRD) . The authors developed a payment method consisting of risk-adjusted capitated payments for individuals on dialysis or with functioning kidney grafts, lump-sum payments for costs of kidney transplants or graft failures, and outlier payments for the most expensive patients. ESRD patients represent the sole group among Medicare beneficiaries that are prohibited from joining HMOs if not already enrolled at time of diagnosis. Yet over 6,400 beneficiaries with ESRD remain in HMOs, having been diagnosed after enrollment in the plan. These 6,400 beneficiaries accounted for more than $270 million in payments to HMOs in 1995.
Modernizing payment methods for Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries is not the only area of inquiry and experimentation in managed care. The commercial sector is experimenting with alternative payment approaches. Hanchak, Schlackman, and Harmon-Weiss, of the multi-State HMO U.S. Healthcare, discuss their company's newly implemented quality-based compensation model. This is a system that 1 Unpublished data from HCFA's Office of Managed Care.
HEALTH CARE FINANCING REVIEW/Spring 1996/Volume 17,.Number 3 provides adjusted capitation rates to U.S. Healthcare physicians on the basis of quality and outcomes indicators. If a U.S. Healthcare physician meets the top tier of quality indicators, he or she can substantially enhance their capitation rate.
Some managed care markets are maturing to the point where competition among plans for the remaining non-enrollees has led to a narrowing of premium differences among plans. To illustrate, in Los Angeles, more than 70 percent of the total population is enrolled in some form of managed care, and there is only a $7-8 difference in commercial premiums for the two leading plans in the area (UCLA Center for Health Policy Research, 1996) . With premium differences narrowing to this extent, purchasers and consumers may increasingly look to quality of care to choose among plans. Plans that provide incentives for their providers to offer continuously improving quality of care may be at a competitive advantage.
As important to the future of managed care financing as market penetration rates and the growing emphasis on quality improvement is the introduction of new types of managed care delivery models and the proliferation of mergers and acquisitions in the managed care industry. The PPO industry began in the mid-1980s as a strategy of insurance companies to compete with HMOs, especially for employer group contracts. PPOs now number more than 1,000, with more than 60 million members (American Association of Preferred Provider Organizations, 1996) . Verrilli and Zuckerman examine trends in physician fee discounts in this increasingly popular managed care model. Managed care plans that rely on discounted payments have increased from about 10 plans in 1981 to more than 700 in 1994; their article looks at two large national insurers' experiences with discounts across types of service and geographic areas.
Beyond new managed care delivery models are the effects of consolidation in the marketplace on managed care financing. Nationwide, 40 percent of managed care enrollment is in the 10 largest HMOs; at the same time, 40 percent of the enrollment is in HMOs with under 50,000 enrollees (American Association of Health Plans, 1995 April 2, 1996) . Obviously, these trends will have effects on how MCOs operate and compete, on how they pay their providers for services rendered, and on consumer and purchaser decisionmaking. Feldman, Wholey, and Christianson look at two critical issues in their article: whether HMO mergers increase or decrease premiums; and whether the effect of mergers differs according to the degree of competition among HMOs.
Clearly, the body of scholarly inquiry represented here and the number of research projects on HMO payments that HCFA is engaged in will facilitate the maturation and modernization of managed care financing. Purchasers and the industry are actively engaged in developing appropriate payment methodologies that adjust for differences in health status among enrollees, and reward the provision of quality care. The success of these efforts, as characterized by the articles in this issue of the Review, will impact on the future of managed care.
